Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS
OF ROLANDO N. G.R. No. 149041
ABADILLA,
represented herein
by
SUSAN SAMONTE ABADILLA,
Petitioners,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)
-
versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
GREGORIO
B. GALAROSA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
x-
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60766 promulgated on
The facts are as follows:
Respondent
Gregorio B. Galarosa (Galarosa) filed on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City or his duly
authorized representative is hereby ordered to reconstitute the original title
that was burned, destroyed or lost from the said owner’s duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261465 to be presented by herein petitioner
or counsel upon FINALITY of this ORDER. Let copies of the same be furnished the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Land Registration Authority.
SO
ORDERED.[4]
In
issuing said Order, Judge Tadeo noted that: the concerned government agencies,
namely, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the Director of Lands, and the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City were duly served copies of Galarosa’s Petition
for Reconstitution; a representative from the Office of the City Prosecutor
appeared at the hearing and interposed no objection thereto; Galarosa caused
the publication of the court order setting the case for hearing in the Official
Gazette dated June 25, 1990, July 2, 1990, and July 6, 1990; said court order
was also posted at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, the Bulletin
Boards of the Quezon City courts, the Sheriff’s Office and at the hall of the
barangay where the property is located; the Register of Deeds also issued a
certificate that the original copy of TCT No. 261465 was burned, destroyed, or
lost when the Office of the Register of Deeds was gutted by fire on June 11,
1988; the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 261465 was brought and presented
before the court and upon verification was found to be genuine and authentic. [5]
When Galarosa presented the said
court order together with his duplicate certificate of title to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, the latter, however, refused to comply prompting Galarosa
to file on
On
While it is true that the Register of Deeds earlier issued a certification, this does not bar said office from refusing to reconstitute because [of] the supervening event, that is, the discovery of the spuriousness of the signature of then Register of Deeds Nestor Peña, has materially changed the situation so that if reconstitution will be ordered by this Court of a non-existent certificate of title, the same will be inequitable and unjust because the Court will be made an instrument in impairing the integrity of the torrens system. Once reconstituted, the spurious title may be conveyed to third persons who are innocent of the infirmities of the title and will have no better right to ownership of the property. It is basic under R.A. No. 26 that for reconstitution to be effected, the title must have been duly issued by the Register of Deeds and destroyed while it was still in force. Since the title, therefore, was spurious because it was not duly issued by the Register of Deeds (whose signature was simulated) and the judicial form used in the Deeds of Ozamis City (not Quezon City), then there was no valid title on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City which was in force at the time of the burning of Quezon City Hall.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the urgent motion is denied.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In
refusing to compel the Register of Deeds to effect the reconstitution, the
trial court gave weight to the (1) manifestation of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, Samuel C. Cleofe, stating that it had to deny reconstitution of
the original of TCT No. 261465 based on the findings of the LRA Administrator
that said title, subject of the order for reconstitution, is of doubtful
authenticity;[8] (2) the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
report finding that the signature that appears on TCT No. 261465 and the
standard sample signatures of then Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Nestor
Peña, were not written by one and the
same person;[9] and the (3)
Consulta of LRA Administrator Teodoro C. Bonifacio stating that Serial Number
4055240 which appears on the face of the owner’s duplicate certificate of TCT
No. 261465, was not assigned to the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City but was
issued to the Registry of Deeds of Ozamis City.[10]
Galarosa
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in its
Order dated
Three
years later, or on
The
Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadillas) filed an Answer on
On
On
LRC Case No. Q-3536(90) of Branch 105 of this
Court is conclusive of the rights of the parties herein. The main issue was finally decided in the
Orders of
ACCORDINGLY, this case is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Galarosa appealed to the CA claiming
that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint and in refusing to rule
that his title is genuine. He then
prayed that the Order dated
On
A simple perusal of the case shows that there is no identity of cause of action. The first action is to reconstitute title, while the second one is for recovery of ownership, annulment of title with damages. There are other issues in the second case which must be resolved by the court. Hence, the first case cannot be considered as a bar to the resolution of the second case.
Even assuming however that the second case is barred by prior judgment, yet judging from the facts presented by the present case, it is beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be followed.
It is worthy to note that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation.
The other errors raised by the plaintiff-appellant need not be resolved by this Court as the same may be threshed out in the appropriate action that appellant may file in the proper court to protect his interest. The appellant should have filed an action for cancellation of title. As held by the Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the order appealed from is accordingly SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The Abadillas filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to no avail.[20] Hence
the present petition on the following grounds:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
QUESTIONS OF
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL
FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE RTC OF
a) The principle of res judicata applies notwithstanding respondent’s attempt to vary
his form of action in Civil Case No. Q-97-31250;
b) Respondent filed Civil Case No. Q-97-31250
for recovery of ownership, annulment of title with damages to have his title
validated in effect, in an indirect or subtle way of challenging the final and
executory judgment in the reconstitution proceeding denominated as LRC Case No.
Q-3536 wherein his title was declared as fake or spurious;
c) It was pointless for respondent to bring an
action for recovery of ownership/annulment of title when he has not disproved
the findings of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the NBI and the LRA
Administrator that his title is fake or spurious;
d) Serious injustice will be caused not to
respondent who holds a fake or spurious title, but to petitioners who have a
genuine and valid title.[21]
Petitioners
argue that: the CA erred in ruling that res
judicata does not apply in
this case as substantial identity of causes of action exists in the petition
for reconstitution of title (LRC Case No. Q-3536[90]) and in the action for
recovery of ownership/annulment of title with damages (CV No. Q-97-31250); “genuineness
of title” has to be alleged and established in both cases; respondent’s
complaint for recovery/annulment is a mere attempt to vary the form of action
from the reconstitution case and thereby avoid the effects of the final and
executory judgment in the latter; res judicata or bar by prior judgment
forecloses not only matters squarely raised and litigated but all such matters
which could have been raised in the litigation but were not; proceedings in the
reconstitution case are conclusive on the rights of the parties, particularly
as to whose title is genuine; respondent did not controvert the manifestation
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the findings of the NBI, the Consulta
of the LRA Administrator, neither did he present evidence to the contrary;
respondent also did not appeal the Orders of Judge Ulep dated September 16,
1993 and April 19, 1994 which have become final and executory; respondent
deliberately suppressed facts which give rise to suspicion that he is a party
to a fraudulent scheme to validate/legitimize fake titles; respondent anchored
his right of ownership on a deed of absolute sale executed by one Wilfredo
Gener, an alleged agent of the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban; Don
Mariano’s claim however was predicated upon a Spanish title, which is no longer
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.[22]
Petitioners
then pray that the Decision of the CA dated
Respondent in his Comment contends
that: he did not appeal the Orders dated September 16, 1993 and April 19, 1994
as said Orders were null and void having been rendered by Branch 105 long after
it had lost jurisdiction over the case; what respondent’s counsel did then was
to file a separate civil case for recovery of ownership, annulment of title
with damages; the genuineness and authenticity of respondent’s title is not an
issue in this appeal; Act No. 496 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529,
Sec. 48, provides that certificates of title are not subject to collateral
attack and may not be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law; the principal issue in the present petition
is whether the dismissal of the complaint in CV No. Q-97-31250 is meritorious,
or whether the Orders dated September 16, 1993 and April 19, 1994 could
properly constitute a bar to the filing of CV No. Q-97-31250; the issue of
whose title is genuine has not been brought to the appropriate courts; there
can be no identity of causes of action between LRC Case No. Q-3536(90) and CV
No. Q-97-31250 as the first involves a court of limited jurisdiction while the
latter involves a court of general jurisdiction.[24]
Respondent filed a Supplement to
Comment, adding that: there can be no res judicata as there is no
identity of causes of action between the first and the second case; even
assuming that the genuineness of title should be established in both actions,
in the latter case, not only genuineness of title must be looked into but
recovery of ownership and damages as well; the two actions entail different
pieces of evidence; a reconstitution proceeding is an action in rem while an
action to recover title or possession of real property is not; respondent
purchased the property from Wilfredo Gener in good faith and for valuable
consideration; for as long as respondent can prove that he was issued a title
which was destroyed, the trial court has no alternative but to grant the
petition for reconstitution; the NBI report is not conclusive and the Register
of Deeds has not presented evidence to disprove the existence of the title of
respondent; in refusing to reconstitute the title of respondent, TCT No.
261465, the Register of Deeds acted illegally and violated his ministerial
duty; there is no suppression of facts in this case as the same form part of
the records which can easily be alleged by petitioners in their answer.[25]
Petitioners filed a Consolidated
Reply insisting that Rolando Abadilla’s acquisition of the property was valid
and his title, TCT No. 60405, is genuine and authentic while Galarosa’s
acquisition of the same is dubious and his title, TCT No. 261465, is spurious
as borne out by the findings of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, LRA, NBI,
and the RTC, Branch 105 of Quezon City.[26]
Stripped to its core, the issue that
has to be resolved in the present petition is: Whether the CA erred in ruling
that the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Annulment of Title with Damages,
CV No. Q-97-31250, filed by Galarosa in 1997 is not barred by the Orders dated
The Court rules against petitioners
and upholds the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA.
Res judicata, which
is being invoked by petitioner, presupposes the existence of the following: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.[27]
It has two aspects: first, “bar by prior judgment” which is
provided in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and second, “conclusiveness of judgment”
which is provided in Section 47(c) of the same Rule, to wit:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgment or final orders. ---
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or
final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; x x x
(c)
In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Petitioners claim that
the civil case for recovery of ownership should be barred by the orders of the
trial court in the reconstitution proceedings; or at the very least, that the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment be applied in this case.
The Court finds that
there is neither a bar by prior judgment nor conclusiveness of judgment.
There is “bar by prior judgment” when
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action, between the
first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case which is sought
to be barred. Under this principle, the judgment in the first case constitutes
an absolute bar to the second action, i.e.,
the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before the same or any other tribunal.[28]
As correctly pointed out
by the CA, there is no identity of causes of action between the reconstitution
case and the civil action for recovery of ownership and annulment of title with
damages. Thus, there can be no bar by prior
judgment in this case.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.[29] It is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint and not by the prayer therein.[30] The test to determine if there is identity of
causes of action is to consider whether the same evidence would sustain both
causes of action, i.e., whether the same evidence which is necessary to
sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in
the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different.[31] When evidence to sustain the respective
causes of action in the two cases is not exactly the same, there is no identity
between the causes of action.[32]
The nature of judicial
reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument or the
reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title which is supposed to have
been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.[33] Its purpose is to have the title reproduced
after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred and not to pass upon the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title.[34] Possession of a lost certificate of title is
not the same as ownership of the land covered by it, and the certificate does
not vest ownership but merely evinces title over a particular property.[35] Indeed, registering land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.[36]
The civil action filed by
respondent is for Recovery of Ownership and Annulment of Title with Damages. It principally delves on the issue of
ownership of the land covered by the title of Rolando Abadilla. Such issue of ownership of Abadilla was not
touched upon in the reconstitution proceedings.
On the other hand, the doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgment”
provides that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action.[37] Under this doctrine, identity of causes of
action is not required but merely identity of issues. Otherwise stated, conclusiveness of judgment
bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[38]
Readily apparent is the
fact that the parties are not the same in the reconstitution proceedings and
the civil case for recovery of ownership and annulment of title with damages. In any case, the applicability of the
doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgment,” in this case, is immaterial as the
genuineness of the transfer certificate of title of Galarosa, which is the
subject of the reconstitution proceeding, is not determinative of the outcome
of the civil case for recovery of ownership and annulment of title.
The issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate civil suit and
should not be confused with reconstitution proceedings.
As pronounced by this
Court in Lee v. Republic of the Philippines[39]
[A] reconstitution of title is
the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. It does not pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Any change in the ownership of the property
must be the subject of a separate suit.
Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate
proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.[40]
In the Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of
Appeals[41]
the Court also explained that:
[I]n x x x reconstitution
under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action
denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition.
The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after
proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction
occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost
or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not
be confused with a certificate of title.
Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence
of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue
of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the
private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 [“Quieting
of Title and Nullification and Cancellation of Title”] before
Branch 74. The trial court will then
conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective
evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the
court to resolve the said issue.[42]
x x x
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(No Part)
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola (deceased) and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Bienvenido L. Reyes; rollo, pp. 42- 50.
[2]
[3] Records, p. 88.
[4]
[5]
[6] See RTC, Br. 105 Order, dated
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Entitled, “Gregorio B. Galarosa,
Plaintiff, v. The Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla (represented by his wife, Susan
Samonte), Defendants.”
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] CA rollo, pp. 6-14.
[18] Rollo, p. 50.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Oropeza Marketing Corp. v. Allied Banking Corp., 441 Phil. 551, 564 (2002).
[28]
[29] 1997 Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 2.
[30] Supra note 27, at 567.
[31] Supra note 27, at 568; Carlet v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 99, 110 (1997).
[32]
[33] Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., G.R. No. 139518, March 6, 2001, 353 SCRA 699, 710; Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219, 228; Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879, 893-894 (1999); Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, 418 Phil. 793, 803 (2001).
[34] Puzon v. Sta. Lucia, supra; Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lee v. Republic, supra.
[35] Puzon v. Sta. Lucia, supra note 33.
[36] Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33.
[37] Tan v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 675, 681-682 (2001).
[38]
[39] Supra note 33.
[40]
[41] Supra note 33.
[42]